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Abstract 
Despite a massive recent proliferation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), there is virtually no 
quantitative research on what drives their dynamism. The aim of this paper is to address this gap and 
analyse the factors influencing SEZ performance – proxied by economic growth – in emerging 
countries. The paper relies on two novel datasets, using night-lights data to proxy for SEZ 
performance and containing a wide range of SEZ policy variables and characteristics across a large 
number of countries. The main results of the analysis indicate that a) zone growth is difficult to 
sustain over time; that b) trying to upgrade the technological component or value-added of the 
economy through SEZ policies is often challenging; and that c) zone size matters: larger zones have 
an advantage in terms of growth potential. Furthermore, country context significantly determines SEZ 
performance. Firms look for low cost locations, but in close proximity to large cities. Proximity to 
large markets as well as pre-existing industrialization also increase SEZ performance. In contrast, 
incentives and other program specific variables are highly context-specific and not structurally 
correlated with SEZ performance. 
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1 Introduction 
The global landscape of production has changed significantly over the past decades. Many emerging 
countries, including, but not exclusively, China, Turkey, and a number of South-East Asian nations 
have successfully inserted themselves into the global economy and have become important 
manufacturing locations. Developing countries in general account for an ever increasing share of trade 
flows and foreign direct investment (FDI). Whereas the developing countries’ share in total 
merchandise exports fluctuated between 20% and 25% at the end of the previous century (World 
Trade Organization, 1996), it reached 43% in 2015 (World Trade Organization, 2016). For the first 
time in history, developing countries received more FDI than developed countries in 2012 (UNCTAD, 
2013). The resulting employment, export creation and upgrading of the technological base allowed 
many countries to increase their GDP per capita, decrease poverty, and improve overall living 
standards at unprecedented rates. While some countries achieved this through the attraction of 
relatively low-tech standard manufacturing industries, such as textiles, based on a traditional cost 
advantage, the emergence of Global Production Networks (GPNs) also contributed to this 
development (Baldwin, 2011; Coe & Yeung, 2015;  Henderson, Dicken, Hess, Coe, & Yeung, 2002; 
Iammarino & McCann, 2013). The emergence of GPNs has been facilitated by improvements in 
transport and communication infrastructure and led to the split of production into separate functions, 
with specific functions located in the most cost effective places (Iammarino & McCann, 2013). 
Particularly since the 1980s, GPNs have fueled trade between developed and developing countries 
(Baldwin & Lopez‐Gonzalez, 2015). This has opened up new opportunities for developing countries 
to not only attract production but also move up the value chain ladder.  
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) have long been prominent in the policy tool box for this purpose.  
Developing countries have been particularly active on this front in recent years. SEZs have been 
promoted with the intention of boosting exports, diversifying the economy, and generating direct and 
indirect jobs. Developed economies have also resorted to SEZs as a way to foster economic 
development in their lagging regions. The early dynamism of some SEZs in parts of the developed 
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world, as well as some cases in China and the Asian Tigers has contributed to enhance the appeal of 
SEZs amongst policymakers in less developed regions and countries as a development tool. 
The popularity and importance of SEZs has rocketed in the last two decades. While there were 176 
zones in 47 countries in 1986, the International Labor Office (ILO) database registered 3,500 in 130 
countries in 2006 (Singa Boyenge, 2007). The Foreign Investment Advisory Service (2009) estimates 
that, in the mid-2000s, SEZs accounted for almost 20% of exports and employed more than 60 million 
people in developing countries. 
Most SEZs share a number of features: 1) they generally have a regulatory and incentive framework 
that is different from that of the rest of the country; 2) they tend to provide dedicated infrastructure 
services; and 3) their area of activity is clearly delineated by physical boundaries (Asian Development 
Bank, 2015; FIAS, 2009; World Bank, 2011). However, zones differ greatly in the application of 
these features, meaning that a wide variety of SEZs has emerged across the world. Even within 
countries, it is not infrequent for different forms of SEZs to coexist, each displaying a different mix of 
incentive schemes, services, industries, and target markets.  
Despite often overstated claims about the impact of the zones and the diversity of economic zone 
policies, there is limited empirical evidence that systematically analyses how differences in the set-up 
of the zones impact on their performance. Hence, our knowledge as to which types of SEZs and which 
incentive schemes have been more successful in contributing to further the goals of the zones remains 
highly imperfect.  
A lack of comparable cross-country data to measure SEZ outcomes and characteristics has limited 
quantitative research on the topic so far. The few studies which have attempted to assess SEZ 
performance drivers in a comparative, quantitative way rely on low numbers of observations (see 
Aggarwal, 2005; Farole, 2011). The most serious attempt to do this to date is Farole’s (2011) covering 
a sample size of 49 to 77 SEZs. This means that the explanatory power of comparative studies 
remains rather low. Most other research has adopted a case study approach (e.g. Engman, Onodera, & 
Pinali, 2007; Nel & Rogerson, 2013; World Bank, 2011). Many of the cases examined represent solid 
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analyses of the economic dynamism and influence of individual zones and provide interesting insights 
about their viability and the characteristics that make them economically dynamic. However, the case-
study nature of such analyses is also not without problems. More often than not research has focused 
on the most successful cases, raising questions about the capacity to generalize the factors behind the 
economic dynamism of a specific SEZ across economic, social, political, and legal contexts that often 
differ widely from those that have contributed to make a particular case successful.  
The purpose of this paper is to overcome this important gap in our knowledge, by shedding more light 
on what makes SEZs – one of the most prominent development strategies of our time – work. This 
implies identifying the drivers of SEZ dynamism (proxied by SEZ economic growth) across countries 
from a comparative perspective. In order to do so, we rely on two entirely new data sets, developed in 
collaboration with the World Bank’s Trade and Competitiveness Practice Department. The first one 
maps SEZs in 22 countries – mostly in the emerging world – assessing the characteristics of the 
zones, the incentives and enticements provided either at the zone or national level for the 
establishment of SEZs, as well as the socio-economic and institutional characteristics of the regions 
and countries in which a zone is located. The second dataset uses nightlights data as SEZ performance 
proxy to overcome the lack of reliable economic indicators when measuring SEZ performance.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides an overview of the existing literature on 
SEZ performance determinants. Section 3 lays out the methodology of the econometric analysis and 
introduces the datasets. A first descriptive account and the results of the econometric analysis 
examining the factors behind SEZ performance are presented in Section 4 and 5. The final section 
introduces the conclusions and preliminary policy implications.  
2 SEZ performance drivers 
The academic literature and a large body of policy best practice guides identify a vast array of factors, 
internal and external to the SEZ programs and zones, which are assumed to affect a zone’s ability to 
achieve its intended objectives. In order to structure our analysis, we group these factors into three 
categories: 1) those factors related to the SEZ program; 2) those related to each individual SEZ; and 
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3) contextual factors reflecting the country and or regional endowment. Figure 1 provides a schematic 
overview of this conceptual framework. 
Figure 1 Conceptual framework of SEZ performance drivers 
 
The first set of factors is related to the set-up and design of the overall SEZ program. This includes 
the incentives package, any requirements imposed on firms to benefit from the incentives, as well as 
the organizational set up of the program itself. Traditionally, fiscal incentives have been at the core of 
SEZ policies. The underlying reasoning is to provide companies with an advantageous cost-reducing, 
fiscal environment. Fiscal incentives vary from country to country and from zone to zone, but 
frequently include a mix of exemptions from import duties on machinery and inputs and reductions or 
exemptions from corporate and other local taxes. Many programs also offer subsidized utilities to 
companies, either through VAT exemptions or explicit subsidies (Asian Development Bank, 2015). 
Studies have come to differing conclusions about the effectiveness of these tax-breaks. While Rolfe, 
Woodward, and Kagira (2004) and Aggarwal (2005) underline the importance of the incentive 
package from an investor’s point of view, Farole (2011) does not find any correlation between the tax 
holidays offered to companies and zone growth in terms of employment generation and exports. 
Similarly, the Asian Development Bank (2015) concludes that while many countries feel the need to 
SEZ Performance
SEZ Program
such as…
Incentives package
• Fiscal and non fiscal
Requirements
• Investment requirement
• Ownership requirement
Program characteristics
• Independence of 
regulator
• Time of program 
establishment
SEZ Characteristics
such as…
Basic zone characteristics
• Maturity 
• Size
• Operator
• Industry focus
Zone location 
• Distance to port/ cities
Services/ infrastructure 
• Power supply in zone
• Administrative support
Contextual Factors
such as…
National and regional
• Institutional quality
• Access/ proximity to 
markets
• Previous level of 
industrialization
• Income level
• Human Capital
The conceptual framework
SEZs – Performance Drivers 710/9/2017
5 
 
offer tax incentives, their effectiveness may be limited and well below those of other pull factors. This 
SEZ specific evidence is in line with the wider literature on the effectiveness of fiscal incentives for 
the attraction of FDI. Blonigen (2005), for instance, concludes that while the obvious expectation is 
for fiscal incentives to work, there is still little clarity on their real effects, given the complexity of 
taxation. Furthermore, in the worst-case scenario, tax exemptions, subsidies, and other incentive 
packages may rear a rent-seeking behavior by firms in the zone, undermining the entire viability of 
the SEZs scheme (Rodríguez‐Pose & Arbix, 2001; World Bank, 2011).  
Exemptions from national labor regulations and the facilitation of administrative services through 
national one-stop-shops is another popular way of providing non-fiscal benefits to companies (Asian 
Development Bank, 2015; OECD, 2009). While the reduction of labor protection is frequently seen 
with concern with regards to its social impacts (Jauch, 2002), several authors claim that more flexible 
labor regulations have contributed to the success of many SEZ policies (Aggarwal, 2005; Madani, 
1999; Watson, 2001). Administrative facilitation through one-stop-shops is generally approved of and 
considered best practice by many international institutions (Asian Development Bank, 2015; Farole & 
Kweka, 2011).  
Programs also differ in the requirements needed by companies in order to benefit from the incentive 
packages. As the aim of many programs is to attract foreign direct investment, some specifically 
target foreign companies, meaning that often only firms either partially or fully owned by foreign 
investors benefit from the incentives schemes. Similarly, as the aim of many policies is to increase a 
country’s export performance, some policies impose a minimum level of exports. Finally, certain 
programs also require minimum investment or minimum of employment thresholds in order for the 
company to access the tax breaks. Despite the proliferation of such requirements, few studies have 
looked into the question if and how they may impact zone performance. The OECD (2009), for 
instance, advocates the need to remove minimum export requirements in order to avoid a bias against 
local firms and to ensure compliance with WTO regulations. But even in this case, it does however 
not say much about how such a measure would impact on SEZ performance. 
6 
 
The organizational set-up of the SEZ program has also been linked to the success of the policies. An 
independent zone regulator – expected to be shielded from political pressures as well as equipped with 
sufficient resources – is commonly considered to facilitate an efficient overview of SEZ program 
development and implementation (Farole & Kweka, 2011; OECD, 2009). As a consequence, 
independent regulators may lead to better economic outcomes at the zone level.  
The second set of factors is made of SEZ characteristics, that is, characteristics that are exclusively 
related to the structure and layout of the zone. SEZ characteristics are generally linked to the 
dimension of the zone, the sectors targeted, its location, as well as to the services and infrastructure 
provided within the zone. In recent years, there has been a shift in the literature and among policy-
makers to highlighting the importance of these factors as opposed to purely relying on the incentive 
package provided in the overall SEZ program (UNCTAD, 2015). Furthermore and in contrast to 
contextual factors, zone characteristics can be influenced and/or modified relatively easily. Hence, it 
is reasonable to expect that the SEZ-specific characteristics will affect the economic performance of 
the zone.  
Among the most prominent SEZ characteristics is the maturity of the zone. Several case studies have 
underlined the challenge for zones to kick-start growth as well as to maintain it after the initial years 
of economic dynamism, as competition from other countries for FDI increases (Henderson & Phillips, 
2007; World Bank, 2011). The technological content of the zone is another factor that may make a 
difference for economic performance. Many zones in less developed areas have aimed to attract 
investors in the high-tech sector as opposed to the low-tech manufacturing on which many initially 
dynamic zones relied (Asian Development Bank, 2015). High-tech zones are regarded as a faster and 
more illustrious way to achieve employment creation and economic growth. However, questions have 
been raised about the viability of high-tech zones in less-developed environments (Luger & Goldstein, 
1991; Quintas, Wield, & Massey, 1992). The nature of the operator has also been identified as a 
success driver with best practice guides frequently emphasizing the advantages of private operators 
over publicly run zones (Farole & Kweka, 2011; OECD, 2009; Watson, 2001). Farole (2011) does 
however not find any correlation between the type of zone operator and SEZ performance. 
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An important question also concerns the location choice. SEZ policies frequently have an explicit 
spatial aspect, i.e. they aim to promote the economic development of certain regions. At the same 
time, a strategic location close to ports, consumer markets, and labor pools are elements many firms 
actively consider when deciding on location (Aggarwal, 2005). Several studies have stated that 
closeness to ports or large cities is more likely to spur zone dynamism than locating a SEZ in more 
remote areas (Asian Development Bank, 2015; Madani, 1999). 
The type of services and infrastructure provided within the zones may also affect their economic 
dynamism. Traditionally many zones have provided services aimed at easing infrastructural and other 
challenges in the country. These services range from the existence of a dedicated customs-office to, 
among others, the provision of more reliable utilities – electricity supplies in particular. Increasingly 
zones also offer other, ‘softer’ services such as human resources, restaurants, housing services, and 
one-stop-shop facilities onsite to deal with administrative processes for the companies within the zone 
(Farole, 2011; World Bank, 2011). It is assumed that these services improve the attractiveness of 
zones and therefore have a positive impact on zone growth. 
Finally, the regional and country context in which the SEZs are located also matters for the growth 
of the zone.
1
 While the aim of many SEZ programs is to overcome the challenges that companies face 
locally, SEZ do not operate in a void and are likely to be heavily influenced by the socioeconomic 
characteristics, market potential, and general business climate of the host country. The country and 
regional context in which a SEZ operates have therefore been highlighted as key for a successful SEZ 
policy implementation (Farole, 2011). A number of authors stress the importance of the national 
investment environment and institutions for FDI (Blonigen, 2005; Daude & Stein, 2007; Portugal-
Pérez & Wilson, 2012) and thus for the dynamism of SEZs. Aggarwal (2005) and Farole (2011) 
report a strong correlation between SEZ outcomes and the general business climate. Moreover, the 
attractiveness of a host country is enhanced/diminished by its proximity/distance and access (or lack 
                                                     
1
 This section is closely related to the more general literature which examines the determinants for FDI [see for 
example Groningen (2004) for an overview]. To give a full review of this stream of literature is however beyond 
the scope of this paper and we restrict the overview to those factors that have been more frequently highlighted 
in research specifically focusing on SEZs. 
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of it) to large markets (Madani, 1999; Rolfe et al., 2004; Watson, 2001) as well as by its industrial 
structure. Trade between countries decreases as distance and trade costs increase (Disdier & Head, 
2008; Álvarez et al., 2018). Hence, proximity to a large national market is an attractive feature for 
efficiency seeking investors. Furthermore, proximity to a technologically advanced nation is regarded 
as particularly important for the integration into GPNs  (Baldwin, 2011; Baldwin & López‐González, 
2015). Favorable national industrial structures with a solid pre-existing manufacturing base also 
increase a host country’s attractiveness (Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009). Economies primarily reliant on 
agricultural production will, in all likelihood, have a more difficult time convincing investors of their 
capabilities to produce manufacturing goods at a large scale than countries with a pre-existing 
industry base. Finally, a country’s overall socio-economic context may be an important 
stimulus/deterrent for investors. Efficiency seeking investors in labor intensive sectors require a 
sufficiently large and cheap workforce and are therefore prone to look for cheaper locations with an 
abundant supply of labor. Human capital endowments affect productivity and are also assumed to play 
a role in making places more or less attractive for firms, in particular in the process of upgrading to 
higher value added products (Larrain, López-Calva, & Rodríguez-Clare, 2009; World Bank, 2011). 
As this overview shows, a large amount of factors, both internal and external to the zones and to SEZ 
policies, are on the table as potential drivers of zone performance. While much has already been 
written about the impact of these factors from a case study approach, a more systematic quantitative 
analysis of whether these factors apply universally is still missing.  
3 Methodology  
3.1 Model 
In order to quantitatively assess the role of the different factors potentially affecting SEZ growth, we 
operationalize the three sets of performance determinants described in the previous section using the 
following simple econometric model:  
9 
 
(1)      ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1SEZ related factorsi,t0 +  𝛽2 𝑆𝐸𝑍 program factors𝑖,𝑡0
+ 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦/𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡0  
+ 𝛽4 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖 
where   
 ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable, measuring the economic growth of an individual SEZ (i) at time 
t;  
 SEZ-related factors depict the dimension of the zone, location, the type of sectors targeted, and 
the services provided. These are zone specific variables;  
 SEZ-regulatory variables reflect the incentives offered, the requirements imposed, and the 
organizational set-up of the program. These variables are either national-level variables or SEZ-
specific, in those cases where multiple SEZ regimes exist within a country; 
 Country/ regional context represent the economic, social, political, and institutional factors at 
the country and regional level that may impact SEZ performance as well as proximity to 
markets; 
 Structural nightlights controls are factors used to improve the fit of nightlights as a SEZ 
performance proxy (see upcoming section on SEZ performance proxy); 
 𝜖i is the robust standard error clustered at the within country-region level 
3.2 SEZ growth 
Ideally, the dependent variable Δyit – reflecting SEZ performance – should be measured using 
indicators such as FDI inflows into the zones, exports from the zone, employment generation (both 
direct and indirect), and value-added. However, as mentioned in the introduction, the lack of such data 
for the great majority of SEZs in emerging countries requires an alternative approach.  
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Stemming from the field of remote-sensing, economists and other social scientists have increasingly 
resorted to light data as a proxy for economic activity in those cases where direct economic data are 
not readily available  (Ebener, Murray, Tandon, & Elvidge, 2005; Elvidge, Baugh, Anderson, Sutton, 
& Ghosh, 2012; Florida, Gulden, & Mellander, 2008; Henderson, Storeygard, & Weil, 2012). 
Nightlight data can be extracted from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) for the 
years 1992-2012. The dataset provides the average luminosity created by human activity going from 0 
to 63 in roughly one-square-kilometer cells – the size of the cells varies with latitude – covering the 
majority of the world’s land area.  
Given the small size of the grid cells, reliable measurements can be obtained for almost any 
geographical area. Mellander, Lobo, Stolarick, and Matheson (2015) demonstrate that the correlation 
between the luminosity and alternative data for economic activity is high even at a very small scale. 
They use data on employment and number of firms from the Swedish Statistics Bureau, which is 
geocoded in cells of 250mx250m, and compare it to that stemming from nightlights data. They find a 
high correlation between the two. Similarly, Levin and Duke (2012) conclude in a study for Israel that 
nightlights are highly appropriate to proxy the extent of human activity at a small scale. 
But how reliable are night-time light data when measuring the economic performance of SEZs? In 
order to use the nightlights data as an SEZ performance proxy, we calculate the luminosity for each 
zone. We identify the size, location, and centroid of each SEZ using google maps satellite imagery as 
well as online sources from the national SEZ authorities and the SEZ homepages. Given the size of 
the nightlight grid cells, we only use zones which are 50ha or larger. A circle is then drawn around the 
centroid as a proxy for the area of the SEZ.  The night-lights within the area of the circle are assumed 
to reflect the economic activity within the zone.
2
 
                                                     
2
 To determine the length of the radius used to draw the circle, it is assumed that the SEZ has a square shape 
identical to the overall surface of the SEZ. A circle is then drawn around the centroid which touches each corner 
of the square. The resulting surface of the circle is consequently slightly larger than the actual zone. 
Experiments with other radius lengths were conducted, but it was found that the method chosen provided the 
best fit. This circle is then overlaid onto the nightlights raster file. If the perimeter of the circle (which represents 
the zone) intersects or passes beyond the centroid of the night-lights cell (such that the centre of the pixel is 
within the buffer), the pixel is included in that count. If the buffer covers more than one nightlights cell, the 
values of both cells are added up. 
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To test the suitability of the nightlights as a SEZ performance proxy, data on the number of 
companies and employment for a number of SEZs were collected as an alternative performance 
measure. Figure 2 shows a simple scatterplot between number of firms and employment and the 
nightlights proxy. Both graphs display a clear positive association between the alternative measures 
and our proxy.  
To further test the fit, we ran two simple regressions, in which the number of firms and SEZ 
employment are the dependent variables and our nightlights proxy the explanatory variable, 
controlling for country fixed effects. In both cases, the nightlights are a highly significant predictor of 
the number of firms and the employment within the zone (see Appendix 1 for the regression results). 
Hence, nightlights represent a good proxy for the employment and firm creation within SEZs. 
Figure 2: Correlation nightlights, number of firms and SEZ employment 
 
It is, however, fair to state that while our proxy on average is a good predictor of SEZ performance, 
there is some spread around the trend line. To identify potential sources of this heterogeneity in the fit 
of the night-light as a proxy for SEZ performance, the satellite images of the outliers visible in the 
scatterplot were inspected. Location in densely populated areas, next to large highways, and/or 
directly on the coastline were the factors that affected the accuracy of the proxy. Zones in densely 
populated areas or next to highways usually reflect a higher amount of lights from outside the zone. 
This is in line with Levin and Duke (2012), who find that a significant amount of the lights reflected 
in the nightlights imagery stems from streets. In order to minimize this reflection, the level of 
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population density around the zone (on a scale from 1 to 3) was identified for each zone. Information 
as to whether specific SEZs are located next to a large water body or a highway was also recorded. 
These three factors were included in the regressions as structural nightlights controls in order to 
improve the fit of the nightlights as proxy for economic activity in the zone. 
The use of night-time lights, nevertheless, does not remain without caveats. As indicated by Keola, 
Andersson, and Hall (2015), studies resorting to nightlights data to calculate economic activity have a 
tendency “to underestimate economic activities that emit less or no additional night-time light as they 
grow”. This is particularly problematic for areas with a high dependence on agricultural activities. 
Given that most SEZs tend to focus on manufacturing or are mixed, our estimates should be less 
affected by this. Differences across manufacturing sectors and technological content are however, 
while probably less pronounced, still plausible. This is particularly true when considering possible 
increases in the technological content or value-added within the SEZ which may happen once the SEZ 
has matured and the labor/firm inflow has levelled out. Nightlights are less likely to be able to capture 
this process. Hence, the results of the analysis will have to be considered in light of these caveats. 
For our regressions, we used three variations of the nightlights proxy. The main indicator is the 
growth rate of the nightlights emitted from the SEZ in the period of analysis. This is the absolute 
growth rate. Using growth rates instead of levels has the advantage that country or zone specific 
aspects (such as differences in lighting technology), which may differ between zones and influence 
the nightlights measurement, are cancelled out. To provide further nuance, we also worked with two 
relative growth rates: (1) the ratio of the change of the nightlight emissions within the zone compared 
to the change in nightlights in the entire country as well as (2) the ratio of the change of the nightlight 
emissions within the zone compared to the change in nightlights in the area within a 50 kilometer 
radius surrounding the zone. While the first indicator, zone growth, provides a measure of absolute 
growth and is our main dependent variable, the two latter indicators provide a relative performance 
measure and capture whether a zone has grown faster than the national or the surrounding area 
average. This allows teasing out differences in national and regional growth across countries, as less 
dynamic zones in rapidly growing countries or regions may often have – as a consequence of the 
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overall dynamism of the country/region – higher rates of growth than very dynamic zones in low 
growth countries/regions. These relative indicators are expected to reflect better the capacity of the 
SEZs to act as a motor of national and/ or regional growth within a country and are used as a 
robustness check. 
3.3 SEZ related and program factors 
Since information on the vast array of SEZ characteristics and program related variables which may 
drive zone growth is not readily available for a large number of SEZs, an entirely new dataset was 
compiled in collaboration with the World Bank’s Trade and Competitiveness Practice. Information 
was collected for the largest possible number of SEZs using a variety of sources. These included 
information available online from SEZ and public authority homepages, reports from international 
organization, and related sources. SEZ authorities and zones were also contacted over email and 
phone to verify and complement the data collected online.
3
  
Table 1 provides an overview of the specific variables covered in the dataset as well as the expected 
sign of correlation with SEZ growth.
4
 A detailed description of each variable is included in Appendix 
3.  
The database includes 346 zones in 22 countries across the developing world and South Korea. 
Appendix 2 provides an overview of the country coverage and number of zones per country. The 
sample covers countries from all over the developing world. It is, however, biased towards countries 
in the East Asia and Pacific region. On the one hand, this exposes the strong proliferation of SEZ 
policies in this part of the world. On the other hand, this is also driven by the fact that many Latin 
American zones do not fulfil the size requirements related to the use of nightlights data (e.g. out of the 
more than 60 zones in the Dominican Republic, only 10 have the required size to be included in the 
                                                     
3
 Appendix 2 includes a detailed description of the database, including the specific SEZ definition and country 
coverage. 
 
4
 While every effort was made to collect data on additional variables, such as the specific sectors of the firms 
operating within each SEZ, only those variables for which data were available for a large enough number of 
zones were included in the analysis. 
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sample). Furthermore, many countries introduced their zone program only recently, meaning that the 
number of zones operational during the period of analysis is limited. 
Table 1: Overview SEZ related factors and SEZ program variables 
Variable 
Expected direction of correlation  
with SEZ growth 
SEZ related variables  
Basic characteristics  
SEZ Size Unclear 
Number of Years Operating Negative 
High-technology Focus Unclear 
Nature of Zone Operator (Public/ PPP/ Private) Positive for private zone operator 
 
SEZ services and infrastructure 
 
 
Customs-office Onsite Positive 
Electricity Sub-Power Station Positive 
One-stop Shop Onsite Positive 
SEZ location  
Distance to Largest City Negative 
Distance to Closest City with at least 500K 
Inhabitants 
Negative 
Distance to Closest City with at least 300K 
Inhabitants 
Negative 
Distance to Closest Port Negative 
SEZ policy variables  
Fiscal and non-fiscal incentives  
Level of Corporate Tax Exemption Positive 
Subsidized Utilities Positive 
Exemption from Labor Regulations Positive 
National One-stop-shop Positive 
Program requirements and independence of zone regulator 
Foreign Ownership Requirement Negative 
Investment Requirement Unclear 
Independence of Zone Regulator Positive 
 
Table 2 provides an overview of some key characteristics of the SEZs within the dataset, i.e. the time 
of establishment of the zones, the sector focus, technology intensity, and size. The majority of zones 
have become operational since 2000 (52%). 30% were established in the 1990s and 18% before 1990. 
This reflects their increasing popularity as a policy tool. There is a wide variety of zones according to 
size: 20% of zones are smaller than 100ha; 38% range between 100ha and 200ha; 33% between 200ha 
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and 500ha; and the remainder (9%) is above 500ha. The largest zone included is 998ha and the 
smallest, 51ha. 
Table 2: Characteristics of SEZs included in the dataset 
Period of establishment  
Before 1990 
1990 to 1999 
Since 2000 
61 (18%) 
105 (30%) 
180 (52%) 
Average size  
Below 100ha 
Between 100ha and 200ha 
Between 200ha and 500ha 
Above 500ha 
70 (20%) 
130 (38%) 
113 (33%) 
33 (9%) 
Sector focus  
Manufacturing 
Services 
Mixed 
241 (70%) 
1 (0.3%) 
104 (30%) 
Technology intensity of industry  
Low and medium technology 274 (79%) 
High-technology 72 (21%) 
Zone operator  
Public 142 (41%) 
PPP 116 (34%) 
Private 85 (25%) 
 
In terms of the sector, 70% of SEZs are fundamentally manufacturing zones, 30% are mixed. Only 
one zone in the sample is purely services focused. The near absence of service-oriented zones is due 
to the fact that service zones tend to be much smaller in area and thus fall through the 50ha filter. 
Approximately 21% of zones used in analysis contain a sectoral focus on high-technology 
manufacturing. 
The type of zone operator is distributed between public, private, or public-private partnership (PPP), 
depending on the set-up of the management company. 41% of all zones are entirely publicly managed, 
while 25% are privately run. 34% are PPPs, involving both the private and the public sector.  
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3.4 Contextual factors 
Finally, the third set of variables – those reflecting the country and regional endowments – is used as a 
base model in order to control for the contextual factors that may influence SEZ growth. At the 
country level, controls for the proximity of a country to large markets, the level of industrialization, 
GDP per capita, and the general business environment, as reflected in institutional variables, were 
included in the dataset. Given the importance of access to markets for companies, the coefficient for 
proximity to large markets can be expected to be positive. Level of industrialization, as measured by 
the share manufacturing of GDP, reflects the inherent capacity of the host country to produce 
manufacturing goods (Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009). A higher value, keeping other things equal, 
should therefore be attractive to companies, leading to a positive coefficient. The natural logarithm of 
GDP per capita reflects a country’s overall level of development and also provides an indication of 
wages. We do not have a strong prior on the sign of this coefficient: on the one hand, companies may 
require a minimum level of development in order to be attracted to an area. The sign may thus be 
positive. On the other, as salaries tend to be lower in poorer countries, zones in less wealthy countries 
may be particularly attractive for firms seeking to reduce costs. Different variables are tested in order 
to capture the general institutional and business environment in the host country, with the results for 
Rule of Law presented in the main regressions. A more stable institutional environment should be 
positively correlated with SEZ performance. Finally, a country nightlights growth is also included in 
the regression to control for the overall change in economic performance in the country. This allows 
us to single out whether a zone’s performance was actually driven by the other characteristics 
included or simply followed national growth.   
The country variables are complemented by a proxy reflecting the level of development and socio-
economic characteristics of the region within the country the zone is located in. As mentioned above, 
for political and social reasons zones are frequently located in lagging regions within a country to 
stimulate economic activity in these areas. The ln ratio of the regional GDPpc over national GDPpc 
provides an indication of how well-off a region is in comparison to the national average. Values over 
0 indicate that the zone has a higher GDPpc than the national average and is thus likely to be endowed 
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with better socio-economic characteristics, but also higher salaries. Values below 0 reflect the 
opposite case. The variable thus allows us to test if zones in lagging regions are performing better or 
worse than those located in economic cores. Complementing the national controls with this ratio also 
allows to control for the immediate geographical context of the SEZ, which, particularly in large 
countries, may be very different from the national average. Details for all variables are included in 
Appendix 3. 
3.5 Estimation strategy 
We conduct a simple OLS econometric analysis of Model (1). While nightlights data are available on 
a year by year basis, most explanatory variable related to SEZ policy and SEZ characteristics are fixed 
over time. A panel analysis is therefore not possible. To maximize the number of zones included in 
the analysis – especially taking into account that the SEZ phenomenon has really taken off in 
emerging countries in the last few years – the main period of analysis covers the period between 2007 
and 2012, i.e. zone growth from 2007 to 2012, for which all variables are available. We also present a 
complementary set of results to add further nuance to the findings. This implies looking at each zone’s 
growth performance in the 5 years after the zone became operational and not for the fixed period of 
2007 to 2012. The aim of this exercise is to uncover the factors that facilitate the economic 
performance of SEZs during the initial years of operation, regardless of when they were founded. The 
sample for this analysis is reduced as data were not available for every zone in the sample in the 
period immediately after their establishment. The reduction in the dataset fundamentally concerns 
older zones.  
4 Descriptive analysis of SEZ performance 
Before turning to the econometric analysis, we examine the performance of the 346 SEZs in our 
dataset for the main period of analysis (2007-2012). The average of the growth rate across all SEZs is 
14.7% over the entire period. A median growth performance of 2.8% and a standard deviation of 28% 
indicate a vast spread in growth among the SEZs. Looking at the SEZ growth rate relative to national 
growth presents further interesting insights. An average ratio of 0.98 shows that zones on average 
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have grown roughly at the same speed as the countries they are located in. Similarly to the absolute 
growth rate, the median is, at 0.95, lower than the national growth level. Again, there is a considerable 
spread with a standard deviation of 0.22. SEZ growth performance has on average, thus, been rather 
moderate – and far from displaying the stellar performance that often drove the design and launch of 
SEZs. Consequently, the ambitious goals of SEZ policies have not been fulfilled during the period of 
analysis. There is, moreover, a large diversity in zone performance.  
For the purpose of a first descriptive analysis, the zones are grouped into different performance 
categories. For absolute SEZ growth, the following three groups are used: 1) shrinking, 2) stable, and 
3) growing. ‘Shrinking’ includes those zones, whose absolute light emissions shrank by more than 5% 
over the period of 2007 to 2012; ‘stable’ zones are those that remained within a +/- 5% range over the 
entire period; and the ‘growing’ group includes those SEZs with an increase in the absolute 
nightlights emissions of more than 5%.
5
 The zones’ growth performance relative to national growth is 
captured in the following categories: 1) slower; 2) equal; and 3) faster. The ‘slower’ group includes 
those zones, whose ratio between zone and national growth is less than 0.9, the ‘equal’ group, those 
which are between 0.9 and 1.1, while the ‘faster’ group, all zones with a ratio larger than 1.1. 
Figure 3: SEZ growth 2007 to 2012 - Number of SEZs in each category 
 
Figure 3 shows the number of zones in each of the groups. The numbers reflect the large variability in 
zone performance. 33 of the zones considered in the analysis shrank from 2007 to 2012, while 150 
had a relatively stable performance and 163 grew. This implies that only half of the zones exhibited 
                                                     
5
 Growth rates refer to the entire period of analysis, not the yearly growth rate. 
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positive growth. Looking at the performance relative to national growth paints an even less positive 
picture: only 65 zones grew considerably faster than the national average, while the vast majority of 
zones grew at the speed of the national economy. One out of four zones grew well below the national 
average. 
Figure 4 depicts the average SEZ growth performance per country. The y-axis plots zone growth, 
while the x-axis shows the ratio of zone over national growth. Countries above the horizontal line had 
SEZs that grew on average. Those below the line shrank. Among those countries included in the 
study, only zones in Pakistan experienced absolute negative growth rates during the period of 
analysis. Zones in Malaysia, Lesotho, Jordan, South Africa, and South Korea remained on average 
relatively stable. The remaining countries display a strong increase in nightlights within the zones.  
The picture is, however, less favorable when we consider the growth performance of the zones 
relative to national growth. The majority of countries has an average ratio below 1 (to the left of the 
vertical line) indicating that nightlights in the zones grew less than in the country as a whole. Even 
countries where the absolute zone growth was dynamic, such as in Kenya, Turkey, and Ghana, SEZ 
growth was lower than overall national growth. In other countries with a high absolute growth, such 
as Vietnam and Russia, zones grew faster than the national average. However the ratio of average 
zone growth relative to national economic growth never exceeds 1.06.    
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Figure 4: Average SEZ growth per country:  
absolute and relative to national growth, 2007 - 2012 
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Figure 5: Average SEZ growth per country:  
relative to surrounding area growth and relative to national growth, 2007 - 2012 
 
Note: White = the country’s zones grew on average at a similar pace as or faster than their 
surrounding areas and the country average. 
Light Grey = the country’s zones grew on average at a similar pace or faster than their 
surrounding areas, but grew at a slower pace than the country average. 
 Black = the country’s zones grew on average slower than their surrounding areas and the 
country average. 
Dark Grey =  the country’s zones grew on average at a similar or faster pace than the country 
average, but grew at a slower pace than their surrounding areas. 
 
 
We repeat the exercise by comparing the relative national growth performance to the SEZs’ growth in 
relation to the growth of the surrounding area (Figure 5). In three countries, Chile, the Dominican 
Republic, and Vietnam (dark green), the zones grew both faster than their surrounding area as well as 
the country average. Jordan is the only country where zones grew on average faster than the 
surrounding area despite growing slower than the national average (light green). In India, the 
Philippines, and Russia, SEZs grew on average faster than or at a similar pace as the country’s 
average, but the zones grew at a slower pace than their surrounding area (those countries colored in 
light red).  In the remaining countries, the zones grew on average both slower than the surrounding 
areas and the country as a whole.     
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5 Econometric analysis  
5.1 Main regressions 
To determine which of the potential drivers of SEZ growth should be included in the regressions, the 
full model is built up in a step-by-step approach. We start by introducing all zone related 
characteristics individually – first without controls and then including country dummies in order to 
test their robustness (Table 3). We then proceed the same way with the policy variables, using 
contextual controls as base model instead of country dummies for the robustness check (Table 4).
6
 
Based on these regressions, Table 5 presents the full model where zone characteristics, policy 
variables, and the contextual factors are regressed simultaneously. Each regression also includes the 
structural nightlights controls and initial luminosity within the zone to improve the fit of the 
nightlights as SEZ performance proxy.  
The econometric results for the zone characteristics and absolute SEZ growth present a consistent 
picture (Table 3). The maturity as well as the size of the zone are consistently significant and robust to 
the inclusion of country dummies (Columns 1 to 4). A high-tech focus of the zone is significant, but 
only in the regression without country dummies (Column 7). In contrast, all other variables related to 
the operation of the zone, the infrastructure provided, and the zone location are not significant. These 
results hold when the zone characteristics are considered and when contextual factors are used as 
controls instead of country dummies (see Appendix 4). The insignificant results of the variables 
reflecting zone infrastructure and services are somewhat counterintuitive, given their prominent role 
in the literature and best practice guides. However, they should be taken with a pinch of salt due to 
potential measurement errors: a one-stop-shop can be available on paper, but not necessarily function 
or function efficiently in reality. This is something that the dataset cannot capture. 
 
 
                                                     
6
 The base model instead of country fixed effects is preferred, since most of the policy variables apply to all 
zones within a country. 
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Table 3: Zone related variables. Dependent Variable: SEZ growth 2007 to 2012 
Basic zone characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Years in Operation -0.00759*** -0.00450***       
 (0.00174) (0.00170)       
Size   0.00124*** 0.00103***     
   (0.000180) (0.000202)     
Operator         
  PPP     -0.0611 -0.0372   
     (0.0419) (0.0402)   
  Private     -0.0142 -0.0213   
     (0.0447) (0.0429)   
High-tech focus       -0.0552* -0.0384 
       (0.0294) (0.0287) 
         
Country dummies - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes 
Structural nightlights 
controls and initial lights 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 345 345 345 345 343 343 345 345 
R-squared 0.167 0.304 0.323 0.393 0.113 0.292 0.110 0.293 
 
Zone infrastructure and services 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
       
Customs-office Onsite -0.0666 -0.0470     
 (0.0423) (0.0519)     
Electricity Sub-Power 
Station 
  0.00960 -0.0190   
  (0.0362) (0.0346)   
One-stop Shop Onsite     -0.0592 -0.0147 
     (0.0383) (0.0418) 
       
Country dummies - Yes - Yes - Yes 
Structural nightlights 
controls and initial 
lights 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 336 336 334 334 345 345 
R-squared 0.116 0.300 0.102 0.285 0.115 0.291 
 
Zone location 
 (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
         
Distance Largest City 3.86e-05 -1.26e-05       
 (2.92e-05) (3.12e-05)       
Distance closest Major 
Port 
  -1.25e-05 1.83e-05     
  (5.31e-05) (5.25e-05)     
Distance closest City with 
at least 500k Inhabitants 
    6.25e-05 0.000122   
    (4.98e-05) (0.000119)   
Distance closest City with 
at least 300k Inhabitants 
      0.000158 0.000174 
      (0.000113) (0.000105) 
         
Country dummies - Yes - Yes - Yes - - 
Structural nightlights 
controls and initial lights 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 345 345 344 344 344 344 344 344 
R-squared 0.111 0.291 0.104 0.290 0.108 0.294 0.112 0.296 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at within country regional level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The correlations between the regulatory variables and the absolute growth performance of SEZs 
(Table 4) are less consistent. Only two out of the seven regulatory variables presented in Table 4 – 
subsidized utilities and the foreign ownership requirement – are significant even when contextual 
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factors are controlled for. In contrast, exemption from labor regulations and the existence of an 
investment requirement for firms located in the zones are only significant if contextual factors are not 
taken into account. They thus seem to pick-up country effects. The remainder of the regulatory 
variables is insignificant. It is also worth noting that the subsidized utilities variable is negatively 
associated with zone performance (Column 4).  
Table 4: Regulatory variables. Dependent Variable: SEZ growth 2007 to 2012 
Fiscal and non-fiscal incentives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Corporate Tax 
Exemption 
-0.000108 -0.00328       
(0.00343) (0.00285)       
Subsidized Utilities   -0.0488 -0.0871**     
   (0.0453) (0.0360)     
Exemption from Labor 
Regulations 
    -0.155*** -0.00516   
    (0.0522) (0.0407)   
National  
One-stop-shop 
      0.0129 0.0374 
      (0.0392) (0.0345) 
         
Contextual controls - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes 
Structural nightlights 
controls and initial lights 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 
R-squared 0.104 0.272 0.110 0.278 0.121 0.269 0.105 0.271 
Program requirements and independence of program regulator 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
       
Foreign Ownership 
Requirement 
-0.259* -0.486***     
(0.154) (0.169)     
Investment 
Requirement 
  -0.160*** 0.0858   
  (0.0282) (0.0571)   
Independence of Zone 
Regulator 
    -0.0597 -0.0405 
    (0.0407) (0.0336) 
       
Contextual controls - Yes - Yes - Yes 
Structural nightlights 
controls and initial 
lights 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 345 345 345 345 345 345 
R-squared 0.109 0.281 0.159 0.273 0.113 0.272 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at within country regional level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As a final step in determining the baseline empirical model, combined regressions in which the 
different types of variables of Model (1) – zone characteristics, SEZ program factors, and regional and 
country characteristics – are run in succession (Appendix 4). While some individual policy variables 
become significant in these combined regressions, they again lose their significance once zone 
characteristics as controls are included. The R
2 
is also considerably higher in the estimations 
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containing SEZ specific variables (Appendix 4, Columns 1, 2, and 3) than in those considering SEZ 
program variables (Appendix 4, Columns 4 and 5). The picture that emerges is thus one in which zone 
specific characteristics play a more consistent and stronger role in driving SEZ performance, while the 
results for the regulatory policies are less consistent and overshadowed by the contextual and zone 
specific controls.  
Based on the results of Tables 3 and 4 (and Appendix 4), Table 5 introduces the full model. To make 
the estimations as parsimonious as possible given the limited sample size, we only introduce those 
variables which were either significant in the previous regressions (such as zone size and years in 
operation) or for which the literature provides a strong prior on how they should affect zone 
performance (e.g. the nature of the operator, location, corporate tax exemptions). Table 5 provides an 
overview of the results. We start by presenting the effect of SEZ specific characteristics, using 
country fixed effects and then sequentially add contextual and SEZ policy specific variables.  
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Table 5: Main regression analysis. Dependent Variable: SEZ growth 2007 to 2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Zones variables + 
country fixed effects 
Zone + contextual 
variables 
Zone + contextual + 
policy variables 
Zone + contextual + 
policy variables 
     
SEZ specific variables 
  
Initial lights in zone -0.000988*** -0.000990*** -0.000986*** -0.000992*** 
(0.000179) (0.000166) (0.000167) (0.000164) 
Years in Operation -0.00303** -0.00330*** -0.00393*** -0.00439*** 
(0.00143) (0.00125) (0.00138) (0.00141) 
Size 0.0931*** 0.0943*** 0.0924*** 0.0937*** 
 (0.0199) (0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0182) 
High-Tech Focus -0.0400* -0.0485** -0.0318 -0.0372* 
(0.0239) (0.0214) (0.0223) (0.0222) 
Operator     
   PPP -0.00974 -0.0190 -0.00566 -0.00288 
 (0.0342) (0.0330) (0.0331) (0.0329) 
   Private 0.0102 -0.0158 -0.0237 -0.0283 
 (0.0428) (0.0329) (0.0379) (0.0384) 
Distance largest city -0.00725*** -0.00456* -0.00477* -0.00556** 
(0.00271) (0.00262) (0.00248) (0.00253) 
SEZ program variables   
Corporate Tax Exemption   0.00255 -0.0787** 
  (0.00351) (0.0311) 
* ln GDP pc    0.00918** 
    (0.00357) 
Subsidized Utilities   -0.0595 -0.0240 
  (0.0429) (0.0447) 
National One-stop-shop   -0.0201 0.0295 
  (0.0411) (0.0370) 
Foreign Owner. Req.   -0.414** -0.438** 
  (0.187) (0.188) 
Independent Zone regulator   -0.0233 -0.0116 
  (0.0279) (0.0265) 
Contextual factors   
Reg. / nat. GDPpc -0.107*** -0.0848*** -0.0900*** -0.0926*** 
(0.0378) (0.0313) (0.0338) (0.0328) 
Proximity to Large Markets  0.0104*** 0.0111*** 0.00939*** 
 (0.00327) (0.00347) (0.00350) 
Industry (% of GDP)  0.375** 0.346** 0.374** 
 (0.158) (0.166) (0.157) 
Rule of Law  0.0145 -0.0282 -0.0474 
  (0.0392) (0.0388) (0.0367) 
GDPpc 2007  -0.0268 -0.00127 -0.0711* 
  (0.0243) (0.0275) (0.0380) 
Country nightlights growth  0.301*** 0.317** 0.101 
 (0.113) (0.147) (0.140) 
Constant 1.295*** 0.710*** 0.498 1.400*** 
 (0.0802) (0.225) (0.308) (0.446) 
     
Country fixed effects Yes - - - 
Structural nightlights  controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 343 343 343 343 
R-squared 0.422 0.388 0.401 0.408 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at within country regional level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
NOTE: Structural controls are the population density around the zone and whether the zone is located directly next to a highway or a water 
body 
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Of the six SEZ specific variables included in the regressions, four show a consistently significant 
correlation with SEZ performance and one displays a significant connection in 3 out of the 4 
regressions. First, the results of the analysis display, as expected, a certain convergence in zone 
growth. The initial level of lights within the zone is negatively correlated with zone economic 
performance in all regressions, regardless of the level of controls included. This implies that more 
established zones in 2007 grew at a slower pace than younger zones and that zones that were created 
at the beginning of the period of analysis. Not surprisingly, SEZs grew faster in the initial years of 
their life, with their economic dynamism plateauing as they matured. 
A second factor that confirms that older, more established zones are generally less dynamic is that the 
coefficient for the number of years the zone had been in operation by 2007 is consistently negative 
and statistically significant in all four regressions. This result is robust to the inclusion of initial level 
of lights in the estimation. Hence, the coefficient cannot be considered as driven by lower levels of 
initial light for newer zones. The economic dynamism of the zones is thus relatively short-lived. 
Growth is higher in the early years of the zone and peters out with time. More established zones in our 
sample, once everything else is controlled for, are less economically dynamic. This is in line with 
much of the literature that has stressed the challenge of maintaining economic performance after an 
initial dynamic period (World Bank, 2011). Caution must, however, be exercised when interpreting 
these results. Mature zones may upgrade technologically and move to higher-value added production, 
which may not be captured by changes in nightlights. While this has been the case in some East Asian 
zones, such as Shenzhen, this does not necessarily always reflect the experience in many other 
countries. Furthermore, the majority of the zones in the sample were established in the late 90s and 
early 2000s, meaning that it is unlikely that they were already in the process of upgrading by 2007.  
Third, zone size matters. The size of the SEZ is positively and significantly correlated with zone 
performance. Larger zones have an advantage over smaller ones when it comes to growth potential.  
Fourth, the results provide consistent evidence that the distance to the largest city is negatively 
correlated with zone performance. Zones located further away from the main city in the country are 
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less dynamic, holding other things constant. This is in line with expectations and the large body of 
literature which emphasizes the strategic role of zone location (Asian Development Bank, 2015; 
Madani, 1999). Alternative city distances were also considered, including distance to the closest city 
of either more than 1 million or 500 thousand inhabitants and distance to the closest major port, but 
the results of the analysis provide no consistent evidence to support the role of large cities – beyond 
that of the main city in the country – or to ports. SEZs have therefore benefited from proximity to the 
largest and often more accessible agglomeration in the country, but the benefits of greater 
agglomeration and accessibility do not expand beyond the primary city.  
Fifth, the more economically dynamic SEZs in emerging countries during the period of analysis have 
been those with a lower technological component. The indicator depicting the presence of high-
technology zones displays negative and statistically significant coefficients in three out of the four 
regressions, albeit with relatively low significance levels. While this coefficient should be interpreted 
cautiously due to the potential inability of nightlights to capture the technological content of the SEZ, 
in emerging countries SEZ growth has been, on average, higher in zones specialized in low-tech, low-
cost manufacturing products and not in those targeting sectors with a higher technological component 
and value added. This result reflects the challenge zones often located in areas with inauspicious 
conditions for the development of high-tech – lacking sufficient skills to generate and/or absorb new 
knowledge; with research centers, universities, and firms below the technology frontier; and 
frequently with limited externalities and capacity to generate and absorb knowledge spill-overs – face 
when aiming to move away from more standard manufacturing and up the value chain (Asian 
Development Bank, 2015; World Bank, 2011; Rodríguez-Pose, Tselios, Winkler & Farole, 2011). It 
also indicates the risks of technology-driven shortcuts to economic development in many parts of the 
world, where the conditions for the rapid development and assimilation of new technology are simply 
not there (Rodríguez‐Pose & Hardy, 2014). Developing countries should thus not expect to be able to 
directly jump into high-tech SEZs, but may rather need to go through developing labour-intensive 
industries initially and then upgrade technologically, once more advanced industrial capabilities have 
been developed. 
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Finally, the nature of the zone management – i.e. public vs. private vs. PPP operator – does not matter 
as much as frequently assumed: there is no sign that private operators are more effective than public 
ones or vice versa. This is in line with Farole (2011) and may indicate a strong context dependency 
for this variable: it is frequently the case that whether zones are operated by the private or public 
sector is dependent on country level policy-making and legislation. 
In brief, the results of the zone specific variables point to a number of structural features that are 
closely connected to zone performance. Zone growth is difficult to sustain over time and the largest 
benefits accrue shortly after start of operations and wane as the zone matures. Larger SEZ have an 
advantage over smaller ones. Moreover and despite a recent push to upgrade SEZs from being purely 
labor intensive ‘sweatshops’ of standard, low value-added manufacturing products to locations for 
industries with a greater technology component, low-tech manufacturing zones have been the most 
dynamic during the period of analysis. Finally, a strategic location in close proximity to the largest 
city in the country is beneficial for zone performance. The insignificant results of the other variables 
likely reflect a large degree of variability and context dependency in terms of these characteristics and 
their impact on growth.  
Program variables (Table 5, Columns 3-4) tend to have a more limited association with zone 
performance than zone-specific characteristics. Only two of the five program variables related to 
incentive packages, program requirements, and set up – among those reported in the analysis, as 
excluded variables are always insignificant – are significant. Hence, specific aspects of the program 
design of the zones – which have been the object of considerable attention in past research – are not 
sufficient in and of themselves to explain zone level growth.  
There is also a limited connection between incentive packages and SEZ growth. Both variables for 
corporate tax exemption and subsidized utilities have an insignificant coefficient in column 3 of Table 
5. This implies that incentives on their own cannot explain zone performance. When we test for a 
varying effect of corporate tax breaks depending on the level of development, the results, however, 
become highly significant (Table 5, Columns 4): the main term is negative and its interaction with 
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GDP per capita is positive. The impact of corporate tax holidays hence depends on the level of 
development: the impact is negative for poorer countries, but becomes positive for wealthier ones. 
The tipping point is at a GDP per capita of 5100US$, where corporate tax exemptions start to have a 
positive correlation with zone performance. Tax breaks may thus be an effective tool to attract 
investments at higher levels of development in emerging countries, but not in those at the bottom of 
the scale.  
The second significant result is the negative correlation between the foreign ownership requirement 
and SEZ growth. Imposing, therefore, a minimum participation level of foreign firms on SEZ 
companies hinders SEZ dynamism. This finding lends support to best practice guides that frequently 
advocate the removal of foreign ownership requirements in order to minimize the distortions created 
by favoring foreign companies over local ones (OECD, 2009). 
The remaining program variables – availability of a one-stop shop and the independence of the zone 
regulator – display insignificant coefficients throughout. Most program factors are thus not drivers of 
SEZ growth. These results go counter claims in many best practice guides, which have underlined the 
importance of program characteristics for the viability of SEZs (Asian Development Bank, 2015; 
OECD, 2009). 
From a program design perspective we can therefore conclude that corporate tax exemptions can play 
an important role in stimulating growth in SEZs, but only under certain circumstances. Furthermore, 
interventions such as imposing foreign ownership requirements can be detrimental for SEZ 
performance. By contrast, the type of program set-up and other benefits are less relevant than 
anticipated.  
Last but not least, examining the results of the contextual factors provides some interesting insights. 
Proximity to large markets delivers significant and positive coefficients, signaling a beneficial effect 
of being close to the customer base and/ or production hubs, as is the case of the previous 
industrialization level. This in line with much of the case study literature that emphasizes the 
importance of ‘traditional’ locational advantages (Madani, 1999; Rolfe et al., 2004; Watson, 2001) as 
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well as newer findings which suggest that proximity to technologically advanced nations facilitates 
the integration into GPNs (Baldwin & López‐González, 2015). It also highlights the challenge that 
countries with an economic structure dominated by agriculture face if they attempt to industrialize 
through SEZ policies.  
In contrast to previous studies stressing the salience of the general business environment (Aggarwal, 
2005; Daude & Stein, 2007; Farole, 2011), rule of law is insignificant in our analysis. 
Experimentation with alternative measures of the quality of institutions at a national level, such as the 
Ease of Doing Business Rank, also delivers insignificant results. Local business environments 
therefore have limited sway over the performance of SEZs. This may also be related to the low-tech, 
low value added dimension behind many SEZs. When the main factors of SEZ growth are related to 
low labor costs, proximity to large markets, and some background in industry, the quality of national 
institutions may matter less than when the more complex networks and value chains related to high 
tech manufacturing are required to be in place. 
The ratio between regional GDP per capita and national GDP per capita is negative and highly 
significant throughout, further underlining the importance of low-cost environments for the 
performance of SEZs. Consequently, SEZs in poorer areas of a country – albeit with a reasonable 
accessibility to the main city – have performed better than those in better off regions. Traditional 
wage-based advantages remain of great importance for firms seeking a location in a SEZ in an 
emerging country.  
Finally, while GDP per capita levels in 2007 are insignificant apart from one regression (Column 4), 
the growth of lights from 2007 to 2012 in the whole country is strongly significant. It displays a 
positive correlation with SEZ growth in two out of three regressions. This positive correlation 
suggests that zones grow faster in rapid growth environments. 
The analysis of the contextual factors, hence, underscores that firms in SEZs still seek, overall, low 
cost locations in less developed areas of the countries and in close proximity to the main city 
(Rodríguez-Pose, Tselios, Winkler & Farole, 2011), and with easy access to North American and 
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European markets. Previous industrialization also plays a role in the economic performance of zones. 
By contrast, institutional factors are less relevant for SEZ economic dynamism. 
5.2 Robustness tests 
In order to test the robustness of these results, we conduct a number of robustness checks (Table 6). 
First, we are interested in examining whether our results hold once countries that contribute the 
largest number of zones to the sample are excluded from the regressions. This allows assessing if the 
results are driven by the experience of one specific country. For this purpose, we first exclude all 
zones located in Vietnam and then those located in South Korea (the two largest contributors to the 
sample with 101 and 64 zones respectively). We also test whether the results change if we exclude 
China’s zones given their relatively large number and differing growth patterns. Secondly, we re-run 
the same regressions, but using the two alternative dependent variables introduced in section 3.2. 
Instead of the zones’ absolute growth rate, we resort to the relative growth rates: the growth rate of the 
SEZ relative to national growth and relative to growth in its surrounding area.  
For the robustness tests, we rely on the most complete estimations including SEZ characteristics, SEZ 
policy variables and contextual factors. Table 6 presents the results. To facilitate the comparison 
between the results, Column 1 includes the coefficients of the main regressions presented in the 
previous section. 
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Table 6: Robustness checks. Dependent Variable: SEZ performance 2007 to 2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Zone growth 
base sample 
Zone growth 
excl. Vietnam 
Zone growth 
excl. South Korea 
Zone growth 
excl. China  
Zone/ national 
growth 
Zone/ surrounding 
 area growth 
       
SEZ specific variables 
    
Initial lights in zone -0.000992*** -0.000743*** -0.00111*** -0.000901*** -0.000803*** -0.000834*** 
(0.000164) (0.000169) (0.000206) (0.000171) (0.000138) (0.000148) 
Years in Operation -0.00439*** 0.000695*** 0.001000*** 0.000851*** -0.00365*** 0.000794*** 
(0.00141) (0.000208) (0.000201) (0.000188) (0.00120) (0.000150) 
Size 0.0937*** -0.00269** -0.00812*** -0.00441*** 0.0756*** -0.00404** 
 (0.0182) (0.00123) (0.00174) (0.00140) (0.0152) (0.00163) 
High-Tech Focus -0.0372* -0.0153 -0.0423 -0.0338 -0.0280 0.000979 
(0.0222) (0.0237) (0.0265) (0.0231) (0.0185) (0.0212) 
Operator       
   PPP -0.00288 -0.0120 -0.0534 -0.00989 -0.00470 0.0445 
 (0.0329) (0.0272) (0.0456) (0.0331) (0.0273) (0.0609) 
   Private -0.0283 0.00172 -0.0660 -0.0407 -0.0225 0.0212 
 (0.0384) (0.0439) (0.0402) (0.0390) (0.0319) (0.0347) 
Distance largest city -0.00556** -4.19e-06 -5.35e-05** -6.10e-05* -0.00440** -5.15e-06 
(0.00253) (2.00e-05) (2.63e-05) (3.11e-05) (0.00209) (2.86e-05) 
SEZ program variables    
Corporate Tax Exemption -0.0787** -0.0544* -0.0912*** -0.0679** -0.0562** -0.0718*** 
(0.0311) (0.0307) (0.0320) (0.0316) (0.0261) (0.0244) 
* ln GDP pc 0.00918** 0.00644* 0.0107*** 0.00809** 0.00662** 0.00838*** 
 (0.00357) (0.00349) (0.00365) (0.00363) (0.00297) (0.00276) 
Subsidized Utilities -0.0240 -0.0353 0.00360 -0.0427 -0.0230 -0.0274 
(0.0447) (0.0454) (0.0555) (0.0424) (0.0378) (0.0528) 
National One-stop-shop 0.0295 0.00485 0.00981 0.0212 0.0237 0.0468 
(0.0370) (0.0384) (0.0599) (0.0384) (0.0310) (0.0399) 
Foreign Owner. Req. -0.438** -0.260 -0.794*** -0.206 -0.357** -0.405** 
(0.188) (0.165) (0.252) (0.228) (0.162) (0.202) 
Independent Zone 
regulator 
-0.0116 0.0244 0.0254 -0.00806 -0.00583 0.00850 
(0.0265) (0.0299) (0.0381) (0.0270) (0.0216) (0.0263) 
Contextual factor     
Reg. / nat. GDPpc -0.0926*** -0.0894** -0.0661** -0.0954*** -0.0722*** -0.0178 
(0.0328) (0.0341) (0.0333) (0.0340) (0.0270) (0.0466) 
Proximity to Large 
Markets 
0.00939*** 0.00643* 0.0131** 0.0116*** 0.00686** 0.00603* 
(0.00350) (0.00345) (0.00543) (0.00422) (0.00297) (0.00338) 
Industry (% of GDP) 0.374** 0.213 0.338** 0.441** 0.264** 0.200 
(0.157) (0.159) (0.162) (0.176) (0.132) (0.183) 
Rule of Law -0.0474 -0.0445 -0.0409 -0.0524 -0.0382 -0.0224 
 (0.0367) (0.0322) (0.0456) (0.0381) (0.0313) (0.0292) 
GDPpc 2007 -0.0711* -0.0293 -0.0741 -0.0654* -0.0476 -0.0567* 
 (0.0380) (0.0418) (0.0514) (0.0378) (0.0331) (0.0306) 
Country nightlights 
growth 
0.101 0.215 0.0771 0.149 -0.652*** -0.453*** 
(0.140) (0.151) (0.184) (0.136) (0.124) (0.127) 
Constant 0.501 0.212 0.460 0.379 1.992*** 1.347*** 
 (0.371) (0.387) (0.407) (0.401) (0.391) (0.255) 
       
Country dummies - - - - - - 
Structural nightlights  
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 343 243 279 310 343 343 
R-squared 0.408 0.434 0.415 0.402 0.354 0.231 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at within country regional level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
NOTE: Structural controls are the population density around the zone and whether the zone is located directly next to a highway or a water 
body 
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By and large, the results hold throughout the robustness tests. Most of the coefficients retain their 
signs, while also maintaining their significance (or insignificance). Some variables lose significance 
in one or two of the regressions (i.e. distance to largest city, industrial share, and foreign ownership 
requirement), but still have the right signs. These minor changes are likely driven by the lower 
number of observations when specific countries are excluded, rather than reflecting a structural 
change in the relationship. Additionally, it is not surprising that some coefficients differ in the 
regression where the ratio of zone growth relative to that of the surrounding area is used. Distance to 
the largest city can influence both the regional and the zone growth rate.  
The one notable exception in the robustness tests is the coefficient for high-technology focused zones. 
While retaining the negative sign in all but one regression, it loses its significance throughout. Again, 
this may be a consequence of the lower sample size and thus lower predictive power. However, this 
result calls for further caution when interpreting the coefficient for high-technology focused zones, as 
already suggested in the previous section 
5.3 Five-year growth rates 
The analysis for the period between 2007 and 2012 contains zones at different stages of development: 
some nascent, some more mature. As the results of the previous sections show, the maturity of zone 
has a bearing on its overall performance and limits the perception of what drives the dynamism of 
SEZs start-ups. Hence, in order to get a clearer picture of the factors behind zone take-off, we analyse 
what determines zone performance in the first five years after the start of operations. This implies that 
the period of analysis is different for each zone, covering the phase between t0 (start year) and t5 (five 
years after the establishment of the zone). This can only be done for a reduced sample, as the 
founding of the SEZ needs to take place after 1992, when the nightlights data become available. The 
sample for this analysis contains 252 zones, in contrast to the 343 considered in Tables 3, 4, and 5. 
 Furthermore, the SEZ dataset currently only contains information for the policies applicable in the 
years from 2007 onwards. We therefore have to exclude the SEZ program related explanatory 
variables from the 5 years growth regressions. All other explanatory variables remain the same as in 
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the previous section with one exception: as each zone’s performance is measured from its start date, 
the years in operation variable is substituted by a variable which reflects the year the zone became 
operational. This allows controlling for the fact that zones started operating at different points in time 
and therefore may have been exposed to different economic environments. 
Table 7 provides an overview of the results. Two dependent variables are considered: the absolute 
growth rate of the zone (Table 7, Columns 1-3) and zone growth relative to national growth (Table 7, 
Columns 4-6).  Columns 1 and 4 show the results taking into account only the SEZ characteristics. In 
columns 2 and 5 the contextual controls are introduced, whereas country dummies substitute those in 
columns 3 and 6. Country dummies have the advantages in this context that they pick up some of the 
effects of the SEZ policies which cannot be included individually in this section.  
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Table 7: SEZ growth in the early years of operation. Dependent Variable: SEZ growth after 5 
years of start of operations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Zone growth Zone growth Zone growth 
Zone/national 
growth 
Zone/national 
growth 
Zone/national 
growth 
       
SEZ specific variables       
Initial lights in zone -0.00156*** -0.00136*** -0.00129*** -0.00118*** -0.00116*** -0.00111*** 
 (0.000246) (0.000278) (0.000277) (0.000242) (0.000252) (0.000317) 
Year established -0.00180 0.00588 -0.0103 0.0101* 0.00485 0.00996 
 (0.00864) (0.00792) (0.00762) (0.00592) (0.00655) (0.00631) 
Size 0.00145*** 0.00132*** 0.00108*** 0.00115*** 0.00114*** 0.00107*** 
 (0.000254) (0.000302) (0.000312) (0.000257) (0.000282) (0.000365) 
High-Tech Focus -0.0754 -0.0494 -0.0756 -0.0468 -0.0470 -0.0609 
 (0.0544) (0.0426) (0.0502) (0.0389) (0.0359) (0.0370) 
Operator       
   PPP -0.00806 0.124 0.138 0.135* 0.117 0.176* 
 (0.0647) (0.0954) (0.0946) (0.0740) (0.0790) (0.103) 
   Private -0.0386 0.00619 -0.0960 0.0345 0.0168 -0.0419 
 (0.0591) (0.0545) (0.0778) (0.0473) (0.0501) (0.0649) 
Distance largest city -7.84e-05 -9.10e-05** -0.000101** -9.11e-05*** -7.89e-05** -8.38e-05** 
 (6.16e-05) (4.56e-05) (4.85e-05) (3.33e-05) (3.94e-05) (3.72e-05) 
Contextual factors       
Ratio regional/national GDPpc -0.0263 -0.0393 0.00699 -0.0791*** -0.0357 -0.0756*** 
(0.0192) (0.0246) (0.0229) (0.0170) (0.0225) (0.0273) 
Industry (% of GDP)  -0.00108   0.000690  
  (0.00505)   (0.00467)  
Proximity to Large Markets  -0.478*   -0.324  
  (0.278)   (0.278)  
Rule of Law  -0.0133   -0.0355  
  (0.0687)   (0.0612)  
GDPpc in year operational  -0.0218   -0.0191  
  (0.0493)   (0.0428)  
Country nightlights growth  0.557***   -0.430***  
  (0.122)   (0.106)  
Constant 3.948 -11.27 20.52 -19.14 -8.341 -19.09 
 (17.27) (15.77) (15.21) (11.83) (13.01) (12.61) 
       
Structural controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects - - Yes - - Yes 
       
Observations 252 252 252 252 252 252 
R-squared 0.240 0.355 0.413 0.247 0.302 0.305 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at regional level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
NOTE: Structural controls include whether the zone is located directly next to a water body. 
 
The results lend further support to some of the findings for SEZ specific characteristics presented in 
Tables 3 to 5. Zone size remains positively correlated with zone growth, indicating a stronger growth 
performance of larger zones in the first five years of establishment. The negative impact of distance to 
the largest city is also confirmed. Zones which are located further away are less dynamic than those 
closer to the largest city. The coefficient for the high-tech dummy remains negative throughout, but is 
not significant. Furthermore, neither the year of zone establishment nor the nature of the operator 
make a difference for zone performance. We find no evidence of either an early mover advantage or 
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of a ‘learning-from-past-errors’ effect, as more recent zones have not had a better economic 
performance in their first five years of life than those that were founded earlier. 
In terms of the contextual factors, most indicators are insignificant with the exception of country 
nightlights growth and the ratio between regional and national GDPpc. The latter is, however, only 
significant in two out of the six regressions. The national growth of nightlights displays the same 
dynamics as those reported in Tables 5 and 6: it is strongly and positively correlated with absolute 
zone growth while it is negatively correlated with the relative growth rate. Proximity to markets is 
negatively correlated, but only in one regression and at the 10% level. This suggests that the result 
should not be overly emphasized. The remainder of the contextual controls is insignificant.  
While these results should be interpreted with some caution due to the lower number of observations, 
they lend further support to the notion, found in the analysis for the period 2007 to 2012, that larger 
zones in closer proximity to the largest city, but in relatively cheap locations display the best overall 
performance.  
6 Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to analyse the factors driving SEZ growth in emerging countries. To 
overcome the challenge of limited data availability for SEZ outcomes and characteristics, we 
assembled an entirely new dataset with information on SEZ characteristics and programs as well as 
contextual factors across 346 zones in 22 emerging countries, which were operational by or before 
2007. Nightlights were used as a proxy for SEZ performance. 
While there is certainly no shortage of research which has focused on the lessons learnt from SEZ 
policies around the world using case study approaches, the analysis conducted in this paper is the first 
to deal with the economic dynamism of SEZs from a quantitative perspective covering a large number 
of zones across emerging countries. The change in approach and method has delivered results that to a 
certain extent confirm, but also refute part of the dominating knowledge about the viability and 
influence of SEZs on economic development in the emerging world.  
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First and foremost, SEZs on the whole cannot be considered as a growth catalyst in emerging 
countries. Despite considerable variation in their performance across and within countries, their 
overall economic dynamism does not exceed that of the countries where they are located, casting 
doubts about claims that portray them as a panacea for growth. 
Moreover, the results of the zone specific econometric analysis point to some crucial structural 
features behind the economic performance of SEZs. Key results include that a) zone growth is 
difficult to sustain over time; that b) trying to upgrade the technological component or value-added of 
SEZs is challenging, as zones focused from the beginning on high-tech sectors have performed worse 
than those in low-cost, labor intensive sectors; and that c) zone size matters: larger zones seem to have 
an advantage in terms of growth potential. 
Country- and regional-specific context further determine SEZ performance. Zones in relatively poor 
areas, but not too far away from the largest city in the country and in countries with relatively easy 
access to the main developed markets of the world have displayed the greatest economic dynamism. 
Zones in countries with a history of pre-existing industrialization have also been favored.  
Incentive packages to attract firms to SEZs and ownership and management schemes, by contrast, 
have had limited influence in the economic growth of the zones. Factors such as the type of operator 
of the zone – private, public, or PPP – corporate tax exemptions, or sundry subsidized utilities do not 
seem to have affected the economic performance of zones across the emerging world. The backbone 
of most SEZ policies, corporate tax breaks, also has played a relatively minor role in zone dynamism, 
which has been limited to the more developed countries in the sample. Hence, the role of factors such 
as tax breaks, the presence of an independent zone regulator, or non-fiscal benefits, such as the 
availability of a national one-stop-shop, is much more context dependent that hitherto thought and 
there is no guarantee that the provision of these sort of support, incentives, and/or subsidies bears fruit 
in terms of zone dynamism.  
The findings of the analysis have important policy implications. They stress the fact that SEZ policies 
in emerging countries do not take place in a vacuum and certain pre-conditions need to be met for 
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these policies to maximize the returns of SEZs. Closeness to attractive markets is essential as is the 
pre-disposition of the economy. A country dominated by agriculture will have difficulty to 
industrialize through SEZ policies alone. Furthermore, a cost advantage through a low cost labor base 
is likely to remain an attractive feature for firms and continue to affect the dynamism of zones and 
their surrounding areas. Policy-makers should therefore consider carefully whether a SEZ program 
can credibly achieve the desired outcomes in a given country context. Moreover, even in places where 
zone programs have a greater potential to succeed, the effects are likely to be limited in time. Hence, 
SEZ policies cannot substitute for wider structural reforms aimed at enhancing the potential for the 
development of economic activities, as well as the absorptive capacity in the country. Finally, there is 
a high degree of context dependency for SEZ policies. Whether a country requires an independent 
zone regulator, a private or a public operator, or certain services are more or less needed in a specific 
zone, depends essentially on the precise context where the zone operates. Different combinations may 
be effective in different contexts. 
The research presented here represents an important change in approach with respect to previous 
analyses about what determines the economic dynamism of SEZs. However, it is certainly not without 
limitations. First, the analysis measures economic growth based on nightlights data. Nightlights are an 
increasingly common alternative for measuring economic activity in those areas of the world were 
economic data either do not exist or are not reliable. However, their use is not exempt from 
controversy, in particular with regards to capturing technological upgrading. Second, the definition of 
SEZs – in part conditioned by the use of nightlights as a proxy for economic growth – discards a large 
number of small SEZs, as well as those that, despite being planned, did not take off or became 
operational after 2007. The sample remains highly dependent on data availability in some countries in 
some specific geographical areas of the world (e.g. East Asia vs. Africa). Finally, the gathering of data 
about the characteristics and programs and incentives associated to the SEZs is limited to the type of 
information that can be readily quantified. This implies a loss of information particularly regarding 
‘soft’ aspects, such as those relating to the quality of services provided at zone level or about the 
political will driving zone implementation, both at the zone and at the national level. Consequently, 
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while, on the whole, the approach represents a considerable step forward in our understanding of what 
makes SEZs across the emerging world tick, given the caveats associated to the approach, the results 
must still be considered with some caution. Further research, for example to understand the ability of 
mature low-tech zones to technologically upgrade and around ‘soft’ aspects of zone management, 
would be a desirable way to address many of the questions about the economic performance of SEZs 
in emerging countries that remain unanswered.    
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Appendix 1 – Regressing nightlights on SEZ firms and 
employment  
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES SEZ employment Number of Firms 
   
Nightlights within zone 177.3*** 0.363*** 
 (23.77) (0.0567) 
   
Country dummies Yes Yes 
   
Constant -7,859*** 9.740 
 (1,909) (9.635) 
   
Observations 104 135 
R-squared 0.556 0.524 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the regional level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 2 – Compiling the SEZ dataset  
In order to identify which of the vast array of factors have a systematic bearing on SEZ performance, 
comparative data about SEZ characteristics and policies had to be collected from scratch. For this 
purpose, a workable definition of SEZs is needed. The definition has to embrace not only conceptual 
but also practical considerations, linked to the suitability of the zone for the use of nightlights data as 
a proxy for its performance as well as data availability. Consequently, all zones included in the dataset 
fulfil the following five criteria: 
 A differentiating regulatory framework and/or incentive scheme is the essential differentiator in 
order to define what constitutes a SEZ. This is in line with most literature and allows 
establishing the all-important distinction between SEZs and other types of industrial parks. 
 A focus on manufacturing or services within the zone with the objective of singling out and 
eliminating zones that are primarily commercial and logistics hubs.  
 The presence of clear territorial boundaries in order to be able to better delimit performance 
using nightlight data. This implies that some SEZ schemes, such as single factory zones or 
large wide zones, are excluded from the analysis. 
 A minimum size of 50ha in order to increase the reliability of the nightlights measurement as a 
proxy for zone performance. This is determined by the size of the grid-cells in the nightlights 
dataset; the data is furthermore restricted to zones with a maximum size of 1000ha to ensure a 
better comparability of the zones. 
 The SEZs had to be operational by the year 2007, meaning that at least one company had 
started operations within the SEZ by then. This criterion ensures that a reasonable variation in 
the nightlights can be detected between start of operations and 2012, which is the last year for 
which nightlight data are available. 
 
For the selection of the countries covered in the database, a number of factors were considered such as 
geography, income levels, and maturity of zone programs.  The objective was to allow for a 
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considerable variation in SEZ experiences to be represented in the sample. The selection was 
furthermore guided by more practical considerations regarding data availability for a given country, 
time of establishment of the SEZ policy, as well as type and number of SEZs.  
In each targeted country, the aim was to identify the entire population of zones and filter them based 
on their fulfilment of the five criteria. For each of the qualifying zones, information was collected for 
SEZ-specific and program-related variables using a variety of sources. These included information 
available online from SEZ and public authority homepages, reports from international organizations, 
and related sources. We, furthermore, reached out to SEZ authorities and zones over email and phone 
to verify and complement the data collected.  
The resulting sample includes 346 zones in 22 countries across the developing world and South 
Korea. Table 1 provides an overview of the resulting country coverage and number of zones per 
country.  
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Overview SEZs per country 
Countries Number of zones 
East Asia & Pacific 255 (73%) 
China 33 
Philippines 29 
Malaysia 6 
South Korea 64 
Thailand 20 
Vietnam 103 
Europe & Central Asia 40 (10%) 
Turkey 36 
Russia 4 
Middle East and North Africa & Sub-Saharan Africa 6 (2%) 
Ghana 1 
Jordan 1 
Kenya 1 
Lesotho 1 
Nigeria 1 
South Africa 1 
Latin America & Caribbean 26 (7.5%) 
Argentina 4 
Chile 3 
Colombia 6 
Dominican Republic 10 
Honduras 3 
South Asia 19 (5%) 
Bangladesh  8 
India 8 
Pakistan 3 
Total 346 (100%) 
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Appendix 3 – Variable description 
Variable Description Source 
SEZ performance  
SEZ growth (Yi,1 - Yi,0)/ Yi,0 : Growth rate of the sum of 
nightlights of the pixels that compose the SEZ 
surface over period of analysis  
Based on National Centers for 
Environmental Information 
https://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/do
wnloadV4composites.html 
SEZ growth relative 
to national growth 
Ratio of change in SEZ light intensity (Yi,1/Yi,0) 
over change of country light intensity (Ycountry ,1/ 
Ycountry,0)  
Based on National Centers for 
Environmental Information 
https://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/do
wnloadV4composites.html 
SEZ growth relative 
to surrounding area 
growth 
Ratio of change in SEZ light intensity (Yi,1/Yi,0) 
over change of light intensity in 50KM circle 
around zone (Y surrounding area ,1/ Y surrounding area,0)  
Based on National Centers for 
Environmental Information 
https://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/do
wnloadV4composites.html 
SEZ related variables  
Years in Operation Number of years zone has been operating in 
2007 
 
Size SEZ size in hectares 
All SEZ related variables are from 
the newly assembled dataset. 
Information obtained as described in 
the body of this paper. 
High-Tech Focus Dummy = 1 if the zone either ‘self-proclaims’ on 
their advertising material that they specifically 
target high-tech sectors or if companies 
established are within high-tech sectors, as 
defined by OECD 
Operator Nature of zone operator: 0 = public, 1 = PPP, 3= 
private 
Variable takes into account whether the public 
sector is involved in the development of the zone 
and/ or provides the land 
Customs-office 
Onsite 
Dummy = 1 if SEZ provides dedicated customs 
office within the zone 
Electricity Sub-
Power Station 
Dummy = 1 if SEZ has its own Sub-power 
station onsite 
One-stop Shop 
Onsite 
Dummy = 1 if SEZ provides ones-top-shop 
services onsite 
Distance Largest 
City 
Road distance in kilometers to the largest city in 
the country 
Distance closest 
Major Port 
Road distance in kilometers to the closest major 
port 
Distance closest 
City with at least 
500k Inhabitants 
Road distance in kilometers to the closest city 
with at least 500,000 inhabitants 
Distance closest 
City with at least 
300k Inhabitants 
Road distance in kilometers to the closest city 
with at least 300,000 inhabitants 
SEZ program variables  
Corporate Tax 
Exemption 
Index based on the level of tax exemption and 
the number of years granted over a 20 years 
horizon. This index can take values from 20 – 
reflecting a company that is 100% exempt from 
paying corporate income tax over the entire 20 
year horizon – to 0 – indicating 0% exemption in 
any of the years. 
All regulatory variables are from the 
newly assembled dataset. 
Information obtained as described in 
the body of this paper. 
Subsidized Utilities Dummy = 1 if firms within the SEZ benefit from 
subsidized utilities 
National  Dummy = 1 if one-stop-shop services are 
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Variable Description Source 
One-stop-shop available to companies within the SEZ from a 
national authority 
Foreign Ownership 
Requirement 
% of firm ownership required to be hold by 
foreign company in order for firm to be able to 
locate within SEZ 
Investment 
Requirement 
Dummy = 1 if regulation require a minimum 
investment by firms in order to establish 
themselves in the SEZ 
Independence of 
Zone Regulator 
Dummy = 1 if zone regulator is an independent 
entity  
Contextual factors  
Ratio regional / 
national GDPpc 
Natural logarithms of Regional GDP per capita / 
Country GDP per capita 
Regional dataset sourced from 
Gennaioli, LaPorta, López-de-
Silanes & Shleifer 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/shleifer/p
ublications?page=1 
Proximity to Large 
Markets 
Sum of the inverse distances from each country 
to the US and European Union 
Based on distances from 
http://www.distancefromto.ne 
Industry (% of 
GDP) 
Industry, value added (% of GDP) in the 
beginning of the period of analysis 
World Development Indicators 
Rule of Law Rule of Law indicator in the beginning of the 
period of analysis. Values range from -2.5 to 2.5. 
 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and 
Massimo Mastruzzi (2010).  "The 
Worldwide Governance Indicators:  
Methodology and Analytical Issues" 
GDPpc  Natural logarithm of the GDP per capita in the 
beginning of the period of analysis (constant 
2010 US$) 
World Development Indicators 
Country nightlights 
growth 
Growth rate of the sum of lights within the 
country in the period of analysis 
Based on National Centers for 
Environmental Information 
https://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/do
wnloadV4composites.html 
Regional GDPpc GDPpc for the within country region the SEZ is 
located in  
Regional dataset sourced from 
Gennaioli, LaPorta, López-de-
Silanes & Shleifer 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/shleifer/p
ublications?page=1 
Structural nightlights controls  
Population density 
around SEZ 
Population density in immediate vicinity of the 
zone: 1 = isolated, i.e. almost no buildings 
around zone; 2 = sparsely populated; 3 = densely 
populated 
Based on visual inspection of SEZ 
sites in googlemaps satellite view 
Waterbody Dummy = 1 if zone is located directly next to a 
waterbody 
Based on visual inspection of SEZ 
sites in googlemaps satellite view 
Highway Dummy = 1 if zone is located directly next to a 
highway 
Based on visual inspection of SEZ 
sites in googlemaps satellite view 
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Appendix 4 – Combined regressions: zone characteristics, 
regulatory variables and SEZ performance 
 
Dependent Variable: SEZ nightlights growth from 2007 to 2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
SEZ specific variables       
Initial lights in zone -0.00111*** -0.00108*** -0.000990*** -0.000278*** -0.000277*** -0.000992*** 
 (0.000158) (0.000192) (0.000166) (5.21e-05) (5.21e-05) (0.000164) 
Years in Operation -0.00487*** -0.00339** -0.00330***   -0.00439*** 
 (0.00136) (0.00149) (0.00125)   (0.00141) 
Size 0.00112*** 0.00101*** 0.000943***   0.000937*** 
 (0.000168) (0.000201) (0.000186)   (0.000182) 
High-Tech Focus -0.0321 -0.0375 -0.0485**   -0.0372* 
 (0.0227) (0.0245) (0.0214)   (0.0222) 
Operator       
   PPP -0.0287 -0.0204 -0.0190   -0.00288 
 (0.0334) (0.0356) (0.0330)   (0.0329) 
   Private -0.0256 -0.000892 -0.0158   -0.0283 
 (0.0334) (0.0453) (0.0329)   (0.0384) 
Distance largest city -6.01e-06 -3.72e-05 -4.56e-05*   -5.56e-05** 
 (2.55e-05) (3.15e-05) (2.62e-05)   (2.53e-05) 
       
SEZ program variables       
Corporate Tax Exemption    -0.00183 -0.0253 -0.0787** 
    (0.00337) (0.0312) (0.0311) 
* GDPpc 2007     0.00264 0.00918** 
     (0.00360) (0.00357) 
Subsidized Utilities    -0.0689* -0.0586 -0.0240 
    (0.0410) (0.0417) (0.0447) 
National One-stop-shop    0.0706* 0.0874** 0.0295 
    (0.0381) (0.0397) (0.0370) 
Foreign Ownership Requirement     -0.496*** -0.502*** -0.438** 
    (0.165) (0.164) (0.188) 
Independent Zone regulator    -0.0366 -0.0337 -0.0116 
    (0.0312) (0.0308) (0.0265) 
Contextual factors       
Ratio regional / national GDPpc   -0.0848*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.0926*** 
   (0.0313) (0.0376) (0.0375) (0.0328) 
Proximity to Large Markets   0.375** 0.689*** 0.702*** 0.374** 
   (0.158) (0.180) (0.173) (0.157) 
Industry (% of GDP)   0.0104*** 0.00981*** 0.00919** 0.00939*** 
   (0.00327) (0.00343) (0.00374) (0.00350) 
Rule of Law   0.0145 -0.0200 -0.0257 -0.0474 
   (0.0392) (0.0365) (0.0365) (0.0367) 
GDPpc 2007   -0.0268 -0.0566** -0.0769** -0.0711* 
   (0.0243) (0.0275) (0.0339) (0.0380) 
Country nightlights growth   0.301*** 0.560*** 0.499*** 0.101 
   (0.113) (0.156) (0.140) (0.140) 
       
Constant 0.229*** 0.285*** 0.0105 0.281 0.481 0.501 
 (0.0700) (0.0727) (0.210) (0.214) (0.341) (0.371) 
       
Country dummies - Yes - - - - 
Structural nightlights  controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 343 343 343 345 345 343 
R-squared 0.348 0.405 0.388 0.294 0.294 0.408 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the within country regional level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
